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ARTICLES
Restructuring the Monroe Doctrine:

Current Litigation Under Section
1983
By SUSAN G. KUPFER*

Introduction
The New Federalism has begun to trickle down through constitu-

tional doctrine. A consistent contingent of the Burger Court supports
the view that initial adjudication of constitutional claims against state
officials should occur in state, rather than federal, forums. In the

course of elaborating on the principles that draw the potential civil
rights plaintiff away from the door of the federal courthouse, the Court

has substantially undermined some of the major tenets of its decision in
Monroe v. Pape' two decades ago.
The effect of a recent spate of decisions altering the remedy provided by 42 U.S.C. section 19832 can no longer be ignored. The Court
is in the process of formulating a theory of federalism affecting litiga-

tion of federal rights in federal courts inconsistent with that expressed
in Monroe. Stretching and twisting existing authority into almost unrecognizable forms to support its view of section 1983 litigation, the
Court flirts with ultimate incoherence in its doctrinal formulation.
Recent decisions demonstrate the difficulties of the Court's ap-

proach. While the Court has been willing to overrule explicitly a basic
* Currently Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. *A.B., 1969, Mount Holyoke College; J.D., 1973, Boston University.
1. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) provides: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Id.
[463]
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aspect of Monroe to provide a more comprehensive remedy, 3 it has evidenced a rather cryptic approach to other revisions of Monroe. For
example, although the Court has at times expanded the scope of the
section 1983 remedy,4 it has taken away with the right hand what it
gave with the left through cases that modify some basic elements of
section 1983.1 The decisions expanding the scope of section 1983
claims will put additional pressure on the caseload of the federal
courts. Development of new restrictions on the availability and applicability of the section 1983 remedy may be a response to this pressure.
But the Court has created these restrictions on an ad hoe, case by case,
basis and their overall integration into the analytical framework is
confusing.
Despite the mounting scholarly comment on section 1983 litigation,6 each term in different contexts the Court provokes the question:
3. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruling Monroe in
part, 365 U.S. at 187-92, held that a municipality could be sued directly under § 1983 and
provided a more extensive reach for damages in those actions involving a municipality.
4. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (extended "under color of state law"
to persons participating in conspiracy with state judge even though judge was entitled to
immunity); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (§ 1983 makes actionable violations by
state officials of federal statutory schemes); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662
(1980) (municipality cannot defend § 1983 action by showing that its officers were entitled to
qualified immunity).
5. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981) (explicit statutory remedies foreclose private right of action and prevent § 1983
claim that might be otherwise available); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247 (1981) (municipality not liable for punitive damages under § 1983); Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (enforceable rights under § 1983 may not
be created if statute has exclusive remedy); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981)
(intentional adverse impact required to state claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Edeman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity bar suits
against state treasury for damages under § 1983). See also Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts,
79 MiCH. L. REv. 5, 5-7 (1980).
6. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 andFederalism, 90 HARv.L. REv. 1133
(1977). See also Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352
(1970); Glennon, ConstitutionalLiberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Section
1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 355 (1978); Katz, The Jurlsprudence of Remedies, Constitutional
Legality aid the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV.1 (1968); Love, Damages:
.4Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1242 (1979);
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV.405 (1977). For a discussion
of the scope of § 1983, see Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965); Whitman, supra note 5. For a discussion of federalism and § 1983, see Bator, The State CourtsandFederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest,Ideology
andInnovation, 22 WM. & MARY. L. REv. 639 (1981); Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Durchshlag, Federalismand
Constitutional Liberties: Varying the Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 723
(1979); Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section
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To what extent will opportunities to pursue initial relief for deprivation

of constitutional rights continue to be available in the federal courts?
Various rationalizations of the policy of deferral to initial adjudi-

cation in state forums7 have been offered by the Court, including a
view of proper statutory construction or legislative intent, 8 the increasing caseload burden in the federal courts, 9 and the limited appropriateness of federal remedial procedures when compared to those available
in state forums.10

A more revealing defense of the Court's actions might involve the

"comity" aspect of federalism; that is, proper respect for the role of the
1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1980); McCormack, Federalismand Section 1983: Limitations
on JudicialEnforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974);
Monaghan, The Burger Court and "OurFederalism," 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 3, at
39 (1980); Neuborne, The Myth ofParity,90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Neuborne, Toward
ProceduralParity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 725 (1981);
O'Connor, Trends in the Relationsh6p Between the FederalandState Courtsfrom the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981); Soifer & Macgill, he
Younger Doctrine: ReconstructingReconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1141 (1977); Weinberg,
The New JudicialFederalism, 29 STAN. L. REv.1191 (1977); Wells, The Role of Comityin the
Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C.L. REv. 59 (1981).
7. See generally Brennan, State Constitutionsandthe ProtectionofIndividualRights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 502-04 (1977); Glennon, supra note 6, at 393-97; Monaghan, The Burger
Court and "OurFederalism,"supra note 6, at 43-47; Soifer & Macgill, supra note 6, at 1142.
8. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980).
An indication of the current Court's judicial restraint is its manipulation of the doctrine
of congressional intent to foreclose § 1983 actions. The Court, by drawing largely unsubstantiated inferences from legislation creating actions supplementary to § 1983, has held that
these specified remedies may replace entirely the § 1983 cause of action. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981) (when
remedial devices in the statute are "sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983"). See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). But see Fair Assessment in
Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177, 196 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (absent
explicit congressional intent, the Anti-Injunction Act in tax cases should not be taken as
evidence of congressional intent to foreclose § 1983 remedy); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980) (passage of Federal Tort Claims Act not intended to replace Bivens remedy unless
Court can find explicit statutory authorization). The holdings in Sea Clammers and Pennhurst seem surprising as there was no explicit language in the statutes involved indicating
congressional intent to replace the § 1983 remedy through the specified statutory remedial
scheme, particularly in light of the Court's position in Carlson.
9. Annual Report ofthe Director ofthe Administrative Office ofthe U.S.Courts (1981),
reporting an increase of filings of civil cases in the district courts. Although the civil rights
cases are not separated out, the statistics indicate that prisoner filings have increased to
concurring);
15,639 in 1981. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 n.13 (1981) (Powell, J.,
Cass,DamageSuits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110, 1159 (1981); Whitman,
supra note 5, at 25, 26-30. The connection between the burgeoning caseload and changes in
the § 1983 remedy was recognized by two Supreme Court justices in their testimony before a
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, see 2 Justices' Budget Testimony
Seen as Hint to Key Decisions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1982, at B8, col. 4. See also note 59
infra.
10. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 46-51 infra.
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states in the constitutional scheme should lead to federal reluctance to

exercise primary jurisdiction on constitutional matters, enabling the
states to develop increased responsibility for implementing constitutional rules through their own institutions."
This particular bias in favor of initial state adjudication surfaces in
interpretations of other areas of the law in which concerns about federalism predominate, including the doctrines of abstention' 2 and equitable restraint,'3 the law of habeas corpus,' 4 and the creation of implied
federal rights of action.15 The Burger Court's theory of federalism mirrors that of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe-thatfederal interference with state institutions is to be avoided, that the states should
share ultimately in the protection of constitutional rights, and that federal remedies should be ancillary to those created, provided, or administered by the states.' 6 In contrast, the majority opinion in Monroe
forcefully delineated the role of the federal courts in administering the

section 1983 remedy. That position, most consistently espoused today
by Justice Brennan, maintains that primary responsibility for definition
and vindication of federal constitutional rights lies with the federal
courts. 17 Moreover, several members of the Court now believe that the

time has arrived to reconsider and revise the principles underlying section 1983 and the Court's decision in Monroe.18
11. City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 908 n.2 (1979) (Relnquist, J., dissenting
to denial of certiorari, quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
12. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
13. Compare Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), with Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971). See also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
14. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976), and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See also Preiser v.Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 499 (1973) as to the interrelationship of § 1983 and habeascorpus for prisoners (habeas
corpus is the exclusive remedy for prisoners who challenge "the very fact or duration" of
confinement, while § 1983 is available for relief from the conditions of confinement).
15. See the fourth criterion for implying a federal cause of action set out in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975). "[I]s the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law?" Id. at 78.
16. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 241-43 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Moore v. Sims,
442 U.S. 415, 427 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-05
(1975). See generally Soifer & Macgill, supra note 6, for an understanding of the development of this line of thought.
17. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S.Ct. 177, 190 nn. 11 &
12 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,246-49 (1967) (quoting
with approval F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:. A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM

65 (1927)).

18. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 521, 555 n.13 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) ("In
view of increasing damages-suit litigation under § 1983, and the inability of courts to iden-
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The reluctance on the part of the Court to consistently adhere to
the original view of the majority in Monroe creates uncertainty about
the conditions under which the federal courts will continue to exercise
jurisdiction in the first instance in certain civil rights actions. 19
In addition to legitimate concerns about the incoherence of judi-

cial policy and its place in the constitutional scheme,2" the availability
and efficacy of a section 1983 remedy in contrast to a state administra-

tive common law tort or statutory remedy, makes a discernible difference in litigation strategy.
First, it is argued that providing a federalforum results in an atmosphere more receptive to constitutional rulings against the excesses
of state officials. 2 ' FederaIjudges with greater expertise on federal con-

stitutional issues are more sensitive to the impact of constitutional
claims.22 Although section 1983 actions can also be brought in state
court, state judges might tend to empathize with their fellow state officials and thus blunt the impact of the remedial relief 2 3 Contraction of

federal jurisdiction by limiting the scope of the remedy generally consigns potential plaintiffs to weaker state remedies in less favorable state
forums, reducing their capacity to obtain relief for constitutional
violations.
tify principles that can be applied consistently, perhaps the time has come for a revision of
this century-old statute-a revision that would clarify its scope while preserving its historical
function of protecting individual rights from unlawful state action"); City of Columbus v.
Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 910-11 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
("ITihe time may now be ripe for reconsideration of the Court's conclusion in Monroe that
the 'federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked' "); O'Connor, supra note 6, at 810 ("In
view of the great caseload increase in the federal courts ... one would think that congressional action might be taken to limit the use of the section 1983").
19. See Field, The Uncertain Nature ofFederalJurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv.
683, 686-87 (1981) (either the jurisdictional rules are unclear or "the rule is well established
but its terms are so elastic that the result they yield on any given set of facts is not predictable"). Professor Field argues that the case law developing the discretionary scope ofjurisdiction of the federal courts masks, through procedural decisions, "value judgment(s) [that]
...reflect hostility to civil liberties cases on the merits" and that one solution would be to
allow an election of the forum by parties where Congress has created concurrent jurisdiction. .d. at 721-24.
20. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property,"supra note 6. "But the cases are capable of broader mischief.... They are capable of generating doctrine and results that are
inconsistent with the long-standing conceptions about the meaning of 'liberty' and 'property'
in a 'Constitution for a free people."' Id. at 443-44.
21. That the provision of a federal forum alone is sufficient justification for § 1983 has
been argued most persuasively by Professor Neuborne. See Neuborne, The Myth ofParity,
supra note 6; Neuborne, TowardProceduralParityin ConstitutionalLitigation,supra note 6.
22. Other commentators disagree. See Bator, supra note 6, at 623; Whitman, supra note
5, at 23-25 (federal forum is "largely symbolic").
23. Chevigny, supra note 6, at 1358.
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More importantly, the content of the remedies of section 1983 and
its Bivens 24 counterpart provides several practical advantages. Damages are obtainable against individuals, 5 punitive damages are available, z6 a jury trial is provided, 7 and attorney's fees may be sought.28
Additionally, as in the case of prisoner actions, suits may be brought
pro se and may be investigated under the auspices of the federal
court.29 By contrast, state administrative procedures, such as tort claim
remedies, provide primarily a summary method of determining easily
proven compensatory damages, award only those damages, shield individual defendants by providing compensation through an agency procedure,30 and normally do not make provision for attorney's fees.3
In addition to obtaining damages for past deprivations of rights,
attorneys bringing section 1983 actions can also procure interim injunctive relief against continuing abuse by state or local officials-a key
consideration in most institutional litigation involving ongoing relationships.32 State tort law further undermines the special significance
of the constitutional violation by reducing it to one compensated only
by reference to traditional tort rules. Injunctive relief is not available
in administrative settings, and if addressed at all in a tort suit, it is
adjudicated without consideration of the substantive policies behind
section 1983.
Several cases from recent terms illustrate the Court's preference
for initial state adjudication of section 1983 claims and its reversal of
some basic aspects of the Monroe decision. The aspects affected were:
Definition: In Parrattv. Taylor,33 the Court defined the
scope of the deprivation of the due process right according to
the availability of a state common law remedy or administrative procedure to compensate the victim.
Exhaustion: The Court has indicated some uncertainty
24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal common law
damage remedy is available against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights).
25. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980).
26. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978).
27. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20-23 (1980) (remedial scheme provided by the Biv
ens remedy was more effective than that provided by Federal Tort Claims Act and thus the
Bivens remedy could be chosen by plaintiff despite the availability of FTCA).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See generaly Eisenberg, supra note 6.
29. Turner, When PrisonersSue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 647-53 (1979).
30. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-8,209 to -8,226 (Supp. 1980), the Nebraska statute
involved in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
31. The Nebraska statute is unusual in that it does have an attorney's fee provision.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 65. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text infra.
33. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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about retaining the blanket nonexhaustion rule34 and has an
opportunity, when it decides Patsy v. Florida International
University,35 to require state administrative adjudication of
constitutional claims before section 1983 can be invoked.
Preclusion: InAllen v. McCurry,36 the Court held, under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, that prior state adjudication is dispositive of issues raised in subsequent section 1983

actions.
I.

Definition

In a series of recent decisions that culminated last term in Parratt
v. Taylor,3 7 the Court applied a high level of judicial scrutiny to factual
situations involving alleged deprivations of liberty or property in order

to determine whether or not a claim is actionable under section 1983.
The scope of the remedy made available under section 1983 has been
strictly delimited by this line of cases, and that redefinition of elements
of Fourteenth Amendment claims has become ensconced as a matter of

constitutional law. Yet, it is still unsettled which kinds of primary
conduct now give rise to a viable claim under the section.
The Court has indirectly restricted the scope of section 1983

through its construction of the due process clause: cases have held that
the interest affected did not constitute liberty or property with regard to
34. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S. Ct. 177, 194-97 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
35. 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981), cer. granted, 102 S. Ct. 88 (1981).
36. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
37. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The cases include Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (transfer
of state prisoner to mental hospital); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (transfer of prisoner to
maximum security institution); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (dismissal of nonprobationary city chief of police); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (dismissal of teacher by state university did not implicate protected liberty or property interests). For a discussion of Paul, Baker, and Ingraham, see
notes 48-50, infra.
38. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property,"supra note 6. "Read literally, section
1983 incorporates every 'liberty' or 'property' interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, statutory explication necessarily becomes constitutional exegesis as
well. ... But quite plainly, a majority of the Court rejects [this broad definition].. . and
seems determined to prevent the escalation of every grievance against state and local government into a constitutional claim." Id. at 408.
However, this is precisely the situation brought about by the decision in Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). The Court must realize some of the consequences of
Thiboutot: an increase in federal caseload coupled with the unpredictability of the types of
wrongs by state oificials that will now constitute § 1983 claims.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 9.463

a state standard for determining such, 39 that there was no "depriva-

tion" of the interest,4" or that the deprivation did not occur without due
process of law.41 This last analysis was employed in Parratt, which
held that the provision of a postdeprivation administrative procedure
that might compensate the injured party fulfills the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and therefore precludes a
section 1983 cause of action.42 This emphasis on procedural regularity,
which the Court seems satisfied exists in almost any state procedure,

vitiates the strength of section 1983 as a plenary federal court remedy.
By not insisting on the existence of a substantiallysimilar remedy, albeit
in a different forum, the Court essentially denies the types of relief especially available under section 1983.43
On its facts, Parratt makes it easy to be unsympathetic to the

plaintiff's desire to "make a federal case out of it."

Taylor, a state-

prisoner, sued prison officials to recover the loss of a mail-order hobby
kit, valued at $23.50, which was signed for by others while he was in
solitary confinement. The kit was subsequently lost and never recov-

ered. Taylor alleged a constitutional deprivation of property without
due process of law and sued directly under section 1983. The lower
court rendered summary judgment in his favor, a decision which was
affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court, with three separate concur-

ring opinions and one, that of Justice Marshall, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, reversed.

Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority found that there was a
deprivation, even though only negligent conduct of state officials was

claimed,' because the officials had acted contrary to established prison
procedures.4 5 Although the Court found that negligence could be ac39. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
40. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
41. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
42. 451 U.S. at 544.
43. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 21-23, as to the differences in effectiveness of the
remedies.
44. In doing so, the Court decided the question that had been avoided in Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), and Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), in the affirmative. The Court held that nothing in either the legislative history or the statutory language
limited § 1983 to intentional deprivations of constitutional rights, and that Monroe itself had
used the word "neglect." 451 U.S. at 531-35. But see id. at 546-54 (Powell, J., concurring).
"As I do not consider a negligent act the kind of deprivation that implicates the procedural
guarantees of the Due Process Clause, I certainly would not view negligent acts as violative
of these substantive guarantees." Id. at 553.
45. Justice Rehnquist noted that the deprivation occurred because the prison officials
failed to conform to established prison procedures regarding the delivery of mail to prisoners specially confined. "There is no contention that the procedures themselves are inade-
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tionable under section 1983, it found that there was not a deprivation
without due process of law because Taylor had a state tort claims procedure available to recover the cost of the kit. That procedure fully
satisfied his Fourteenth Amendment entitlement."
Parratt formally relegates to state tort claims procedure actions
that could have been brought concurrently under section 1983. It effectively reduces the twin aims of section 1983--compensation and deterrence of unlawful official conduct---47 to one: compensation. It defies
the congressional attempt to create a plenary remedy by substituting an
abbreviated one in state forums. The danger of such substitution is
that this approach abdicates federal judicial responsibility for fact finding in order to determine whether or not a federal right has been violated.
In effect, Parratt substitutes procedural due process for
substantive due process guarantees.
In so doing, Parrattfollows the line of reasoning that the Court
has been pursuing through Paul v. DaVis, 4 8 Ingraham v. Wright,49 and
Baker v. McCollan.50 Together, these cases evidence a disturbing tenquate nor... [that] the State [could have provided] a predeprivation hearing." 451 U.S. at
543. Nevertheless, the prison officials were acting "under color of state law." Home Tel. &
Tel. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
46. 451 U.S. at 543-44.
47. In Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978), the Court said, "[t]he policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal
rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law." Compare
Robertson with Whitman, supra note 5, at 48-52, as to the "attenuated" effect on deterrence
of official misconduct through the award of damages. See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 254-56 (1978) (actual injury must be proved to justify more than nominal compensatory
damages, although punitive damages are allowable under § 1983).
48. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Paulheld that reputation, standing alone, is not constitutionally protected as either liberty or property. The plaintiff's name and picture had been included on a flyer of "Active Shoplifters" which the police had circulated to merchants. The
Court based part of its decision on the notion that the interest injured in the case could be
protected by state tort law and that it did not rise to an independent constitutional level. Id.
at 701.
49. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). Ingraham involved a § 1983 claim filed by students who were
subjected to corporal punishment in public schools. Although the punishment was meted
out immediately following the infraction, an administrative hearing was available after the
fact to test the propriety of the action. The Court held that the post-beating hearing was
sufficient to satisfy due process and that therefore the students' challenge to the procedure
did not state a claim under § 1983.
50. 443 U.S. 137 (1979). Baker concerned another factual situation implicating police
procedures. In Baker, the plaintiff's § 1983 claim was based on the detention following an
arrest that was admittedly valid but of the wrong person. While in confinement for three
days, the plaintiff repeatedly requested the sheriff to confirm his claim of mistaken identity.
The Court first addressed whether or not the sheriffs negligence (as the majority termed it)
would be actionable under § 1983 and determined that there was no deprivation of liberty
amounting to a constitutional violation. The Court thereby avoided reaching the question
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dency to redefine the scope of the section 1983 remedy by removing
from its ambit cases that also might fit into settled state procedural
remedies. Justice Rehnquist seems to believe, on the grounds of feder-

alism, that it is wise policy to have primary adjudicative responsibility
left to the states. 5' There is little logic otherwise for the Court's refusal
to find that these particular instances of state action violate constitu-

tional guarantees.
These decisions destroy the major effect of Monroe's holding that

the federal remedy of section 1983 was concurrent with and "supplementary" to any available state remedy.52 They must also be criticized
from the perspective of the litigator, who, in initially choosing the type
of action to bring, needs solid, not incoherent, criteria to determine
when otherwise available state remedies or procedures will make sec-

tion 1983 unavailable.
Parratt raises some doubt about the validity of the Court's ap-

proach to constitutional litigation. First, one would think that the
monetary amount of the claim would not matter when constitutional

rights are at stake.5 3 By using this case to limit the scope of section
of whether or not the sheriff's conduct was negligent or deliberate. The holding was based
on the reasonableness of the sheriff's conduct under the circumstances.
51. Justice Rehnquist, author of the majority opinions in § 1983 cases such as Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), and Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976), has had a strong influence on the language defining the scope of the § 1983
claim. It seems that one of his chief concerns is precisely the one raised in Frankfurter's
dissent in Monroe: that the federal court system will, through expansion of the § 1983 right,
interfere with the daily administration of state business by state officials. Seegenerally Shapiro, Mr.JusticeRehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1976). The result of
foreclosing the § 1983 remedy is to require the plaintiff to pursue other available state procedures; this was explicitly stated as the position of the Court in Paul,424 U.S. at 712 (plaintiff
should pursue an action at common law for defamation), Baker, 443 U.S. at 145 (complaint
might state a claim for false imprisonment under state law), and Parrau,451 U.S. at 544
(existence of state tort claims procedure sufficient to compensate for injury). See also Whitman, supra note 5, at 8-11.
52. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 183. The independent nature of the § 1983 remedy is
established. In principle, it stands for the necessity to redress violations of federal constitutional rights in a federal forum because the constitutional interest should be defined and
protected by the federal system. See id. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring). The original language in Monroe about the "supplementary" nature of the remedy has been held to mean
that it is available regardless of alternative remedial procedures under state law, id. at 183,
state administrative remedies, McNeese v. Board, of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), or, as in the
parallel Bivens remedy against other federal claims, procedures such as the Federal Tort
Claims Act, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 19.
53. Section 1983's jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976), has never required a minimum amount to be in controversy as a prerequisite to a federal court claim
because of the substantive nature of the interests arising under the Civil Rights Act. See
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); Lynch v. Household Fin.
Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 501 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring).
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1983, however, the Court implies that the federal courts cannot be

bothered with trivial cases. The real issue is not the recovery of the
value of the hobby kit, but the availability of a remedy that might re-

dress instances of unconstitutional action by state prison officials. Second, in contrast to the rest of the citizenry, prisoners are in a uniquely
unfavorable position; their captivity makes it difficult to receive information about their legal rights 54 and subjects them to the control of
prison authorities. 5
For prisoners, section 1983 is more effective than state remedies to
redress repeated but isolated deprivations of property or liberty. A suit
against a guard or prison official in an individual capacity is allowed
56
under section 1983, but not under most state tort claims procedures.
Neither does a state procedure provide the interim injunctive relief,

available in a section 1983 action, that allows a judge to pinpoint effective remedial treatment. On these grounds alone, the two remedies

simply are not equivalent. Despite the assertion that a state remedy is
adequate, a prisoner who has suffered only a small monetary loss, but
who seeks access to the federal court for ancillary injunctive relief, is
clearly disadvantaged under this decision.
The substance behind the triviality argument is, of course, the necessity to conserve judicial resources and the enormous increase in

caseload caused by section 1983 cases, a situation often mentioned by
the commentators.5 7 It is certainly difficult to argue that trivial actions
should be allowable in the face of an overburdened federal judiciary,

yet the solution to crowded dockets should not be careless judicial redefinition of a constitutional standard."
Congress' failure to redefine section 1983, given the available sta-

tistics on the federal caseload, should convince the Court that it is Con54. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 554 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
55. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
56. See Turner, supra note 29, at 611, 644.
57. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 546, 554 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Weinberg, supra note 6. "It is difficult to resist the conclusion that much of this federal door
closing is not so much a function of enlightened federalism or even an evolving political
environment as of crowded dockets." Id. at 1203 (footnote omitted).
58. The potential implication of the Court's reasoning is illustrated by a recent lower
court decision that relied on Parratt. In Sheppard v. Moore, 514 F. Supp. 1372 (M.D.N.C.
1981), the court dismissed a claim under § 1983 alleging an intentional deprivation of the
plaintiffs' property by county officials following a criminal investigation. The.court read
Parralt to require dismissal since there was a postdeprivation procedure (a common law
action in conversion) available under state law to redress the damage. Id. at 1377.
Although Parraft and Sheppard are technically consistent with Monroe, as they are
both interpretations of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment and not of § 1983, they
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That Congress is aware of

the crowded dockets is clear from the recent enactment of 42 U.S.C.
section 1997e,6" which sets up a limited exhaustion requirement for cer-

tain cases brought by prisoners. That statute specifically delineates the
circumstances under which exhaustion would be required, and instructs

the lower court to retain jurisdiction for ninety days while the administrative claim is being pursued.6

Because Congress has so recently

demonstrated this limited approach to the problem of prisoner lawsuits
in federal courts, it is an abuse of judicial power for the Court now to
find that state administrative procedures should become a complete

substitute for the section 1983 action.
The decision in Parratt,coupled with an expanded vision of the
principle of Allen v. McCurry,6 2 has the alarming potential for making

section 1983 relief completely unavailable to prisoners. If most state
compensatory procedures would satisfy the Court's general delinea-

tions of due process, collateral estoppel would then bar any further federal court remedy.6 3 Persons bringing section 1983 actions face a hard
clearly alter the Court's assumption in Monroe that the existence of a state administrative or
common law remedy would not bar access to federal court.
Another puzzling legacy of Parrat is whether or not its holding will also be applied to
limit actions claiming deprivation of a liberty interest. (One assumes that no postdeprivation procedure could compensate for a loss of life.) There is no logical reason why the Court
would not construe "liberty" to be subject to the same due process analysis as "property."
There are fewer common law analogues to compensate for deprivation of a liberty interest;
the torts of false imprisonment and battery are possible examples, but they are not capable
of reaching constitutional claims based upon allegations of denial of equal protection or
interference with voting rights. Sheppard portends thefurther erosion of the § 1983 remedy
when any remedy is available under state law.
59. Approximately 30,000 suits were filed under § 1983 in the United States district
courts during 1980, comprising 17 percent of the courts' entire civil case load. After III
Years FederalfRightsLaw FacesGrilling," N.Y. Times, March 7, 1982, § E, at 2, col. 3. One
commentator believes that application of the principle of Parrauwill result in a reduction of
§ 1983 filings by as much as 90 percent. K. DAVIS, TREATISE ON ADMINISTRATiVE LAW 416
(Supp. 1982).
When § 1983 was amended in 1979 to include the District of Columbia, Congress did
not attempt to revise in any way the construct of that section. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979).
60. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7, 94 Stat.
352 (1980). The Act remits prisoners who file lawsuits under § 1983 to "plain, speedy, and
effective" administrative grievance procedures if a court determines that reference to these
procedures would be appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1980). The procedures themselves must be found to be in "substantial compliance" with standards set forth by the Attorney General or so determined by the court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(2). See also note 79 infra.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1980).
62. 449 U.S. 90 (1980). For a discussion of Allen, see text accompanying notes 91-107
infra.
63. See text accompanying notes 91-102 infra.
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choice: either to bring the action initially in federal court and wait for
the motion to dismiss in order to raise the substance of the due process
concern, or, in the interest of expediency, to begin the state procedure
and face potential resjudicata or collateral estoppel problems in the
subsequent federal court suit.

II. Exhaustion
Before the Court this term is the case of Patsy v. FloridaInterna-

tional University,64 which presents an opportunity to reverse still another aspect of the original conception of Monroe v. Pape-thataccess
to the federal courts under section 1983 does not require exhaustion of

state remedies. Patsy involves a section 1983 claim alleging reverse racial discrimination and sex discrimination in employment. The plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief against a state university. The
district court dismissed the case on motion for failure to exhaust the

employer's administrative remedies, which consisted of a university
grievance procedure. 65 That decision was reversed and remanded by a

panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but following a rehearing
en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed again, holding that there was no

blanket rule excepting section 1983 actions from traditional rules requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.6 6

Quite to the contrary, Monroe and a long line of cases 67 have
countenanced an exception to the general rule that administrative remedies must first be exhausted when the action involves a claim brought
under section 1983. The Monroe decision boldly stated that the "independent" and "supplementary" section 1983 remedy, which it recog-

nized and reinforced, did not depend on initial resort to state judicial
tribunals prior to the entry of the federal claim.6 8 The section 1983
64. 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 88 (1981).
65. The procedure itself is outlined in 634 F.2d at 925 n.7 (Hatchett, J., dissenting), 92728 (appendix to opinion). Not only must a complainant pursue the grievance procedures of
the university, but, following an unfavorable decision, a claim must then be entered with the
Human Relations Commission (HRC). Both administrative agencies lack enforcement
power, the orders of the HRC must be enforced through a Florida trial court, with appeal
through the state appellate system.
66. 634 F.2d at 912-14. The Fifth Circuit required, absent any traditional exceptions to
the general exhaustion rule, exhaustion of adequate state remedies as a procedural prerequisite to filing a § 1983 claim.
67. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 490 (1980); Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249 (1971); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963). See also Fair Assessments in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 102 S. Ct.
177, 190-91 nn.1 l&12 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. 365 U.S. at 183.

476
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exception to the exhaustion requirement was also recognized in
McNeese v. BoardofEducation,69 which held that reference to administrative remedies supplied by a local school board would not be required before litigation of bection 1983 claims of racial discrimination
and segregation in the school system.7 °
In Patsy, majority and dissenting opinions in the Fifth Circuit differed in their versions of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 and of the import and stare decisis effect of the Supreme
Court's decisions since Monroe.7 Disagreement at this level, based ultimately on different policy positions, can only be resolved by the
Supreme Court, and Patsy provides the Court with an opportunity to
alter another aspect of Monroe.
Institution of a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would
have a burdensome effect on potential section 1983 plaintiffs. Exhaustion of state administrative procedures is not only time consuming but
also is expensive if done with legal assistance. An exhaustion requirement inevitably delays gaining access to a federal forum,72 and in some
cases, such delay results in permanent exclusion from the federal
courts. 7 3 In Patsy, the Fifth Circuit expressed the hope that resort to the
state administrative procedure would result in timely settlement of the
claim in terms favorable to the plaintiff.74 Even if that were the outcome, Congress, in enacting the provisions of section 1983, 75 and the
Court, in deciding Monroe, have operated on the presumption that the

access to the federal forum and vindication of the substantive rights
69. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
70. Id. at 671, 676.
71. Compare 634 F.2d at 906-08 (majority opinion), with 634 F.2d at 914-16 (Rubin, J.,
dissenting), 916-26 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). The en banc majority favored a flexible exhaustion requirement, monitored by the district court.
72. Ms. Patsy's case could conceivably be delayed up to a year if she followed each step
of the procedure set forth in the appendix to the en banc opinion, 634 F.2d at 927-28.
73. Since state statutes of limitation borrowed for analogous § 1983 actions are not
tolled pending exhaustion of state administrative procedures, § 1983 actions not brought
within that statutory period would be foreclosed. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.
478 (1980).
74. 634 F.2d at 913. "[W]e think that a carefully devised, well-monitored exhaustion
requirement might well advance the cause of potential civil rights litigants." Id.
75. Congress created concurrent jurisdiction in § 1983 actions with the clear intent that
the federal courts provide immediate access for adjudication of constitutional violations.
See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 368, 376, 389 (1871). "It seems. . . proper, to make
a permanent law affording to every citizen a remedy in the United States courts for injury to
him in those rights declared and guaranteed by the Constitution.. . ." Id. at 368 (remarks
of Rep. Sheldon). "[Tihis bill throws open the doors of the United States courts to those
whose rights under the Constitution are denied or impaired." Id. at 376 (remarks of Rep.
Lowe).
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protected by section 1983 are guaranteed as matters of the first
instance.7 6
The practical problems created by a court-imposed exhaustion re-

quirement are numerous. Without specific statutory authority delineating the administrative procedure, plaintiffs will have difficulty knowing

which claims require which types of state administrative exhaustion.
Certainly, after Maine v. Thiboulot,7 section 1983 actions will arise in
thousands of different state and local agencies having differing administrative systems. 78 Can it seriously be said that policy dictates the exhaustion of any state remedy as an improvement over immediate access
to a federal court? Congress has determined a comprehensive scheme
for cases involving certain prisoners; only such a carefully tailored

scheme would suffice were an exhaustion requirement imposed.7 9
Certain aspects of the section 1983 remedy could be lost with com-

pelled primary resort to state agency adjudication. For example, preliminary injunctive relief generally is unavailable through state
agencies. It is unclear whether a federal district court would take juris-

diction to provide such relief pending the outcome of the administrative process. Furthermore, requiring plaintiffs to resort initially to state
administrative agencies might result in findings of waiver if they did
76. Even Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent in Monroe, presumed that one of the major
purposes behind the enactment of § 1983 was that fact finding for constitutional violations
would be done in the federal forum, "in lieu of the slower, more costly, more hazardous
route of federal appeal from fact-finding state courts." 365 U.S. at 251 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in result). For the Court's agreement with the presumption, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). See also Soifer & Macgill, supra note 6 at 1188-90.
77. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Because of Thiboutot, potential violations of § 1983 can now
occur through official abuses in any federally mandated statutory schemes involving joint
federal-state participation. The sheer number and kinds of state agencies involved in implementing and administering federal statutes and regulations give an indication of possible
complications for a state administrative exhaustion requirement before bringing a § 1983
suit.
78. Perhaps the Court is predicting this will indeed be the result of Maine v. Thiboutot
and, at least subconsciously, is the reason for the recent decisions retrenching access to federal courts in § 1983 claims.
79. The legislative history surrounding the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1981) suggests the care and.determination with which Congress applied itself in drafting the limited
exhaustion requirement for prisoners. See 125 CONG. REc. H3634-35 (daily ed. May 23,
1979) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at H3636-37 (statement of Rep. Drinan).
It also is clear that Congress had detailed information about the caseload situation in
§ 1983 filings generally and chose to address only a limited aspect of that problem. See, e.g.,
125 CONG. REC. H3635 (daily ed. May 23, 1979) (statement of Rep. Harris); id. at H3639-40
(statement of Rep. McClory).
Even the majority in Patsy felt that exhaustion should be required only when there was
a district court determination that an "adequate and appropriate" remedy existed for exhaustion, 634 F.2d at 912-14. The implication is that a general exhaustion requirement
without specific reference to a carefully drawn statutory scheme would be valueless.
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hot first commence their agency action. Such findings would then effectively preempt subsequent section 1983 action for failure first to exhaust state remedies.8 ° Statutes of limitations could also create

problems for potential section 1983 plaintiffs, since utilization of administrative procedures does not toll the statutes. 8' Finally, most state
tort claims procedures require judicial review of the agency action, and
under Allen v. McCurry, any findings by a state court might have a res

judicata or collateral estoppel effect in any subsequent section 1983
action. 2
This term, the Court had occasion to review the exhaustion doctrine in Fair Assessments in Real Estate Association (FAIR) v. McNary.83 The plaintiffs in FAIR sought compensatory and punitive

damages against county and state tax officials under section 1983 for an
allegedly unconstitutional assessment of property taxes. Their section
1983 action followed a series of administrative appeals to the State Tax
Commission and some state court actions, several of which were still

pending at the beginning of the federal suit. The district court dismissed the section 1983 lawsuit, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court also affirmed. The majority of the Court, per Justice
Rehnquist, held that comity and the Younger doctrine 84 required the
Court to refuse to exercise section 1983 jurisdiction.8 5 Even though equitable relief was not sought in the case, the Court held that in order for
plaintiffs to prevail in the section 1983 action, there would have to be a

finding, similar to a declaratory judgment, that the tax assessed was
unconstitutional. The majority noted that:
80. The waiver argument made in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 115 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), is particularly disturbing to the potential § 1983 litigant. Given the confusion,
absent a clear congressional delineation about whether or not the exhaustion requirement is
present, and, if present, through which administrative procedure it must be pursued, those
bringing § 1983 claims might very well foreclose their federal remedy by failing to exhaust
administrative remedies in a timely manner.
81. See note 73 supra.
82. For example, the Nebraska Tort Claims Procedure detailed in Parratprovides for
judicial review of the administrative decision in the state courts. NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-8,214
(Supp. 1980). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976), the statute utilized in "cCurry, a state court
determination would have a preclusive effect on any subsequent § 1983 action, and would
therefore, under McCurry, foreclose a § 1983 action, in federal court. See text accompanying notes 91-102 infra.
83. 102 S.Ct. 177 (1981).
84. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger doctrine requires, on the
grounds of comity, federalism, and equity principles, a federal court to dismiss an action
whenever there is a pending state court action in which the constitutional issues can be
raised.
85. 102 S.Ct. at 185-86.
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[T]he intrusiveness of such § 1983 actions would be exacerbated
by the non-exhaustion doctrine of Monroe. .

.

. Therefore, de-

spite the ready access to federal courts provided by Monroe and
its progeny, we hold that taxpayers are barred by the principle of
comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state
tax systems in federal courts.86
The Court did not reach the question of whether or not the Tax
Injunction Act,8 7 standing alone, prevented the section 1983 action in

the case. Justice Brennan, writing for four members of the Court in a
concurring opinion, rejected the notion that the discretionary principles
of comity and federalism could force federal courts to refuse to accept
jurisdiction under section 1983. He argued that "displacement of section 1983 remedies" could be accomplished only by a "clear statement
of congressional intent."88 Although he, too, stopped short of deciding
that the Tax Injunction Act itself was evidence of congressional intent
to restrict section 1983 jurisdiction, he did require exhaustion of state
administrative and judicial remedies as a precondition to a federal action when the exhaustion of those remedies is required for similar suits
against the tax brought in state court.8 9
The Court's current elastic view of the nonexhaustion requirement
for section 1983 actions expressed in FAI4R, may extend to future decisions such as Patsy. Although it is true that state tax systems traditionally have received hands-off treatment from the federal system and
that, arguably, Congress intended to address the disruption of state tax
collection by federal courts when it enacted the Tax Injunction Act,
FIR might presage similar judicial flexibility in federal court jurisdiction in other cases. The majority's willingness to utilize a discretionary
doctrine such as comity to refuse section 1983 jurisdiction provides little comfort to those who believed that, after Monroe, access to federal
courts was guaranteed. Justice Brennan's concurrence was careful to
recognize the continuing nonexhaustion principle of Monroe and to
distinguish the special class of state tax challenges from other situations, such as habeas corpus, in which only Congress could require
exhaustion. 90
Nevertheless, even Justice Brennan's assurance that this is only a
narrow judicial exception to section 1983 actions involving challenges
to the state tax systems does little to assuage the concerns of those who
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976).
102 S. Ct. at 196 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 195-97.
Id. at 196.
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fear that the Court might just as easily create other exceptions to the
guarantees of section 1983.

III. Preclusion
A potentially disturbing aspect of the Court's deference to the initial adjudication at the state level for cases with concurrent federalstate jurisdiction arose inAllen v. McCurry.9 1 That case involved a section 1983 suit against police officers for damages based upon an alleged
illegal search under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue of the unconstitutional search and seizure had been raised in the
section 1983 plaintiff's prior criminal trial in state court at a pretrial
suppression hearing. Although the search was held to have been constitutional, some of the evidence seized that had not been in plain view
was suppressed. 92 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the police defendants in the section 1983 action on the ground that since Stone v.
Powell9 3 made a habeas remedy unavailable on the Fourth Amendment claim, a section 1983 action was the only opportunity for a federal
district court to hear the constitutional claim for damages.9 4
The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, found simply that 28 U.S.C. section 173891 required collateral
estoppel on the issue litigated in the state criminal trial. The Court
further found that neither the statutory language, the legislative history,
the policies behind the decision in Monroe, nor the Constitution required "one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that [federal] right in
a federal district court." 96 If a party has a "full and fair opportunity"
to litigate the issue once in an earlier case, a section 1983 action is thus
precluded.9 7
Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, recognized the ramifications of the majority's decision. He spoke
to several elements of the protective nature of section 1983:
91. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
92. Id. at 92.
93. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (writ of habeas corpus not available to relitigate claim-under
Fourth Amendment that had been adjudicated in the context of a prior criminal trial).
94. 449 U.S. at 91, 93-94, 103-04.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) provides, "The records and judicial proceedings of any
court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions ...
" Id.
96. 449 U.S. at 103.
97, Id. at 104.
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The legislative intent, as expressed by supporters and understood
by opponents [of the 1871 Civil Rights Act], was to restructure
relations between the state and federal courts. . . Even when
there was procedural regularity, which the Court today so
stresses, Congress believed that substantive justice was unobtainable ... 98 Congress consciously acted in the broadest possible

manner.

99
/oster
Justice Blackmun then relied on both Monroe and Mitchum v.
for the proposition that the strength of the provision of the federal remedy was that it enabled the federal courts to act as "primary and final
arbiters of constitutional rights.""
Because the Court's decision in 4llen was not expressly limited to
Fourth Amendment situations, nor indeed to criminal cases, 10 1 it is an
easy matter to envision other contexts in which potential section 1983
litigants mights be forced to confront this dilemma. Certainly, allegations challenging the legality of police procedures such as arrests and
searches or allegations of police brutality would require initial factual
determinations affecting the issue of unconstitutionality to be made in
criminal trials, determinations which would foreclose an otherwise
available section 1983 action for damages.
It is neither fair nor logical to bind a section 1983 plaintiff to a
determination made in a prior criminal proceeding. First, the standard
that a state court trial judge is likely to apply as to the admissibility of
evidence casts a different light on the Fourth Amendment right than
that shed on a section 1983 claim. In a criminal proceeding, a judge
might be more inclined to find no constitutional violation in order to
admit evidence so that the "truth-seeking" process of a criminal trial
will not be impaired. In addition, the pragmatic concern of a defendant in a criminal proceeding-to avoid a conviction by excluding incriminating evidence---differs significantly from the goal of a section
1983 proceeding-to vindicate constitutional rights by seeking damages. Although winning the criminal trial is of first, importance, the
lawyer representing the criminal defendant must also weigh the likeli-

98. Id. at 107-09.
99. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). Ironically, Justice Stewart was also the author of the Mitchum
opinion.
100. 449 U.S. at 110 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. For discussion of the effect of the preclusive doctrines of collateral estoppel or res
judicata,see Averitt, FederalSection 1983 Actions ier State Court Judgment, 44 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 191 (1972); Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata
andthe FederalCourts, 31 HASTINGS L.. 1337 (1980); Theis, Res Judicatain Civil Rights Act
Cases: An Introductionto the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 859 (1976); Torke, Res Judicatain
Federal Civil Rights Actions Following State Litigation, 9 IND. L. Rav. 543 (1976); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 6, at 1133, 1330-54.
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hood of success on any motion raising constitutional rights against the
subsequent rights of his or her client to monetary damages under section 1983.102 In short, Allen would force a criminal defendant to

choose between raising the constitutional violations in defense motions
made during the criminal proceedings, only to be precluded from raising those issues in a subsequent section 1983 action, and not raising the
issues at the criminal trial in order to pursue monetary relief in the
subsequent section 1983 action. In reality, this is no choice at all.
A further danger follows from the fact that section 1738 similarly
applies to civil actions; it applies to judicial review of an administrative
proceeding in state court. The entire class of claims deferred to state
adjudication under the principles of Parralt and Patsy thus would be
barred from relief under section 1983.
It is also unclear whether the majority's requirement in Allen of a
"full and fair" opportunity to litigate could be extended to suggest that
a section 1983 defendant might raise the defense of waiver by the plaintiff as to issues not completely raised and aired during the prior court
proceedings.
More importantly, Allen demonstrates yet another instance in
which the Court appears to view "due process" as encompassing procedural regularity and little else. Remitting a potential section 1983
plaintiff to a prior opportunity to be heard in radically different circumstances celebrates form over the substance of the section 1983 right as
elaborated in Monroe. The Allen decision indicates that a majority of
the Court would prefer to defer completely to state procedures rather
than, at a minimum, provide a federal judicial check on the substantive
merits of the initial state adjudication. Allowing primary adjudication
of federal rights to be determined in a state setting moves away from
the Court's position in Bell v. Hood,10 3 which held that the grant of
jurisdiction°4 to the federal courts is a source of the power to shape
remedies.1
To support a shift from the reasoning in Bell toward the theory
developed in Allen (which perhaps is justifiably rooted in frustration
with dual adjudication and relitigation),10 5 one needs to believe consistently not only that the remedy will be the same but also that adjudica102. See Allen, 449 U.S. at 115-16 (Blackmun, ., dissenting).
103. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
104. For a view that the Bell decision required a development of a judicially protective
remedy to vindicate constitutional claims, see Katz, supra note 6.
105. For a broad discussion of a theory of restraint from duplicative or overlapping proceedings in the application of equitable intervention by federal courts in state court matters,
see Theis, Younger v. Harris: Federalismin Context, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 103 (1981).
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tion in each forum will yield substantially the same result. 10 6
The point is not, as has been argued, that there is no logical reason
why state court or agency adjudication might not conceivably be
equally sensitive to federal constitutional issues, 0 7 but that the statute,
its legislative history, and Monroe all determine that there be federal
enforcement in a federal forum. This determination cannot be discarded based on the mere availability and minimal procedural propriety of a different forum. The Allen case does much to dissipate the

substantive spirit behind section 1983.

Conclusion
In his dissent in Monroe, Justice Frankfurter maintained that fed-

eral interference through the provision of a plenary, prompt, and thorough federal remedy might wreak havoc with state institutions and
procedures.10 8 He may have been right to worry about the specifics of
enforcement through use of the section 1983 remedy. The Monroe de-

cision paid much attention to the description of a broad, general substantive policy of federal protection of civil rights against state officials,
but did not linger long on the specifics of the remedy provided by the
statute.' 0 9 The clear implication was that it was left to the federal
106. See Bator, supra note 6, at 621-29; Cover, supra note 6, at 668-80 (concurrency of
jurisdiction evolved for substantial reasons, including the perceived success of dispute resolution when an alternative forum was available).
107. Compare Bator, supra note 6, at 623-35, with Neuborne, The Myth ofParity,supra
note 6, and Neuborne, TowardProceduralParityin ConstitutionalLitigation, supra note 6.
108. 365 U.S. at 211-21, 233-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
109. The majority opinion in Monroe made no mention at all of the specific procedural
elements that were to become part of any lawsuit under § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 speaks to
the laws that should govern civil rights actions. "The jurisdiction. . . [of the lower federal
courts in civil rights actions] shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of
the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all
cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to
furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the
trial and disposition of the cause ... " 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). But see Eisenberg, upra
note 6, at 508-15, arguing that § 1988 should not apply to cases under § 1983 unless removed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 to federal court.
It is unclear what kinds of inconsistency between state and federal law would be necessary before the courts could declare the action to be governed by federal common law.
When faced with these issues, the Court has shown a willingness to "borrow" the relevant
state law. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) (analogous state statute of
limitations and coordinate tolling rules govern federal § 1983 action); Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) (state survivorship statute applied in § 1983 action). But see
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (federal common law controls survivorship of federal
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courts or to Congress to fill in the details and provide the basic struc-

ture of the lawsuit within the framework laid out by the Court.110

The Court in Monroe did not and could not anticipate all the
questions to be raised by the remedy it created or all the uses to which
that remedy might be put. The Burger Court has chosen to resolve
both the question of interference with state institutions and the burden
of the heavy caseload by changing the scope of the right itself through
the addition of procedural wrinkles in the fabric of the original remedy.

This judicial approach is misguided. Any change in the substantive
scope of the right is more appropriately left to Congress."'
The most startling emphasis throughout these recent decisions is

the Court's stressing of procedural assurances over substantive guarantees. Monroe established a settled policy of federal definition of the
scope of the right, and federal exposition and implementation of the
section 1983 remedy. A majority of the Burger Court appears to be
satisfied that this level of federal court involvement can be replaced
merely by assurance of the existence of state procedures" 2 and that
federal scrutiny ends with the assurance of state procedural regularity.
These recent pronouncements have resulted in vitiation of the
principles expounded in Monroe. One effect of this doctrinal trend is to

place litigators of section 1983 claims in a quandary. Litigators are
faced with uncertainties and with the choice either of submitting the

claim initially to the applicable state forum to fulfill jurisdictional prerequisites, with a possible preclusionary effect on the subsequent section 1983 action, or of risking dismissal of the section 1983 action on
grounds of failure to state a claim or failure to exhaust administrative
Bivens remedy). Although the cases speak of the primacy and independence of the federal
remedy from any other available state remedy, "uniformity" of results in § 1983 lawsuits
was held not to require a general federal rule to resolve these procedural issues in favor of
§ 1983 plaintiffs. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 489; Robertson v. Wegmann,
436 U.S. at 594 n.1 I; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975) (§ 1981
action). Regarding the Bivens remedy, however, the Court in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980), held that even though the Federal Tort Claims Act was available to satisfy plaintiffs
complaint for compensation, the characteristics of the Bivens remedy (punitive damages,
jury trial) made the remedy a more effective deterrent to unlawful official conduct. The
Court thereby created, a uniform federal policy for Bivens actions. Id. at 21-23. Carlson
reaffirms the specifics of the § 1983 remedy. Id.
110. The Carlson case also suggested that Congress has the primary authority to alter the
provisions of the § 1983 or Bivens remedy and that congressional intent was crucial to the
determination of conflicting views of the content of the remedies. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 1921.
111. For criticism of this methodology in earlier cases, see Durschlag, supra note 6.
112. The danger of this approach is demonstrated as well in the Younger line of cases.
Soifer & Macgill, supra note 6, at 1191.
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remedies. This difficulty can only generate hesitancy on the part of
potential litigants to file federal constitutional claims against state offi-

cials. The ultimate result of this judicial preference for state court adjudication is a noticeable retraction of the rights guaranteed by
Congress in voting1 3 the section 1983 remedy and underscored by the
Court in Monroe.

113. The Supreme Court reversed Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F.2d
900 (5th Cir. 1981), under the name of Patsy v. Board of Regents while this article was in
pageproofs. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (June 21, 1982). In a majority opinion, written by Justice Marshall, the Court held that exhaustion of state administration remedies was not required before commencing a § 1983 action. Id. at 2568. The majority's
analysis relied heavily on derivation of congressional intent from the Civil Rights Act of
1871 as well as from the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. 102 S. Ct. at 2461-66. See text
accompanying notes 59-61 supra. The majority felt that the Court had not "deviated" from
its refusal to impose a judicially mandated exhaustion requirement since the McNeese line
of cases, see note 67 and accompanying text, supra, and could not find a policy argument
that would convince it to do so now. 102 S. Ct. at 2560.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, joined by Justice Rehnquist, felt constrained to follow
the clear intent of Congress, while remarking as an aside that the caseload burden alone
should prompt Congress to require exhaustion in all § 1983 cases. Id. at 2568 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell, with Chief Justice Burger, dissented on a jurisdictional ground,
but noted that exhaustion of available administrative remedies is "dictated in § 1983 actions
by common sense, as well as by comity and federalism." Id. at 2579 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Although the decision in Patsy demonstrates the Court's marshalling of a majority to
refuse a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement, the concurrences or dissents of five of
the justices (Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist concurred; Justice White concurred in part;
and Justice Powell dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger on the exhaustion of remedies
portion of the dissent) indicate a questionable commitment to preserving the federal remedy
explicated in Monroe. The Court's increasing concern with burden of the federal caseload,
and its own tendency to use discretionary doctrines such as federalism and comity, vitiates
the initial right to a federal forum in civil rights cases. This may indicate that judicial tinkering with the § 1983 remedy will continue.

